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DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED CORPORATIONS
ARE THE MEMBERS OF A DEFECTIVELY ORGANIZED
CORPORATION LIABLE AS PARTNERS?
By CHARLES E. CARPENTER*
A RE the members of a defectively organized corporation liable
as partners? The decisions of the courts are in conflict.
Where there is defectiveness of incorporation but the de facto
requisites1 have been complied with, there is substantial agreement
of the decisions that the members of the organization are not
personally liable unlimitedly to the creditors of the corporation. 2
If however the defect of incorporation goes beyond this and the
requirements for a de facto corporation have not been met there
is disagreement in the decisions. One group of cases, about half,
holds that the members of such an organization are not liable
individually as partners by reason of such defectiveness of or-
ganization,3 and the other group holds the members are individu-
*Professor of Law, University of Oregon.
'The de facto requisites have been stated by Professor Edward H.
Warren in 20 Harv. L. Rev. 464 as follows: "1. That an attempt to
incorporate has been made resulting in a colorable corporate organization;
2. That there was a law authorizing the formation of such a corporation
as was attempted; 3. That there has been user of some of the powers
which such a corporation would possess; and 4. That the persons seeking
to prevent collateral attack acted in good faith."
Machen says, in 1 Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 285: "If there
be a valid statute under which a company might be incorporated, a bona
fide colorable attempt to comply with the law, and finally an organization
and exercise of corporate functions all the authorities which recognize
the doctrine of de facto corporations, would, probably, agree that a proper
case has been made for holding that the company is a de facto, if not a
de jure, corporation."
2Professor Burdick in an article entitled Are Defectively Incorporated
Associations Partnerships? 6 Col. L. Rev. 1, contends that the members
should be held liable as partners and he would not draw the line where
the de facto requisites have been met.
Professor Edward H. Warren thinks other considerations than the de
facto requisites should be weighed in determining liability.
3 Stafford National Bank v. Palmer, (1880) 47 Conn. 443; Brooke v.
Day, (1907) 129 Ga. 694, 59 S. E. 769; Planters, etc., Bank v. Padgett,
(1882) 69 Ga. 159; Ward v. Brigham, (1879) 127 Mass. 24; Salem First
Nat. Bank v. Almy, (1875) 117 Mass. 476. Trowbridge v. Scudder, (1853)
11 Cush. (Mass.) 83; Fay v. Noble, (1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 188 (leading
case); Roberts Mfg. Co. v. Schlick, (1895) 62 Minn. 332, 64 N. W. 826;
Johnson v. Corser, (1885) 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. 799; Central City Say.
Bank v. Walker, (1876) 66 N. Y. 424; Fuller v. Rowe, (1874) 57 N. Y. 23.
(But see Zabriskie v. Coates, (1899) 41 App. Div. 316, 558 N. Y. 523;)
Perrine v. Levin, (1910) 68 Misc. 327, 123 N. Y. S. 1007; Blanchard v.
Kaull, (1872) 44 Cal. 440; Humphreys v. Mooney, (1880) 5 Colo. 282;
Ward v. Brigham, (1879) 127 Mass. 24; Jessup v. Carnegie, (1880) 80
N. Y. 441, 36 Am. Rep. 643; Rutherford v. Hill, (1892) 22 Ore. 218, 29 Pac.
546, 17 L. R. A. 549, 29 A. S. R. 596; Swafford Bros. Dry Gds. Co. v. Owen,
(1913) 37 Okla. 616, 133 Pac. 193.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ally liable unlimitedly upon the ground that by virtue of such
defectiveness of organization they are partners.4
In our restatement of the law, which of these views, if either,
shall we adopt? Shall we treat defectively incorporated associa-
tions as partnerships or not?
It is the contention of this article that because it is opposed
to a correct conception of the nature of the stockholders' liability
on the contract of the corporation, the reasons given for it are un-
sound, and it is bad economic policy. The doctrine that members
of defectively organized corporations are partners should be
abandoned.
To treat those who take stock in a corporation as partners
where incorporation is defective is out of harmony with a correct
conception of the nature of the stockholders' liability on corporate
contracts. What is the nature of the stockholders' liability? The
usual mode of thinking and of speaking of the corporation is that
it is an entity distinct from the stockholders, and that this entity
is the party to the contracts and the owner of the property, while
the stockholder is a mere claimant against the corporation. But
in reality the corporation is simply a method by which natural
persons own property and manage business. The courts have
frequently recognized this.5  Professor Hohfeld has made a
graphic statement of this relation. Let me quote his words:6
I 4Forbes v. Whittemore, (1896) 62 Ark. 229, 35 S. W. 223; Garnett v.
Richardson, (1879) 35 Ark. 144; Winfield v. Truitt, (1916) 71 Fla. 38,
70 S. 775; Duke v. Taylor, (1896) 37 Fla., 64, 19 S. 172, 53 A. S. R. 232, 31
L. R. A. 484; Flagg v. Stowe, (1877) 85 Ill. 164; Bigelow v. Gregory,
(1874) 73 Ill. 197; Pettis v. Atkins, (1871) 60 Ill. 454; Coleman v. Coleman
(1881) 78 Ind. 344; Kaiser v. Lawrence Say. Bank, (1881) 56 Iowa 104
8 N. W. 772; 41 Am. Rep. 85; Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon, (1912) 86 Kan.
460, 121 Pac. 340; Sanders v. Herndon, (1908) 128 Ky. 437, 108 S. W. 908,
32 Ky. L. Rep. 1362, 110 S. W. 862, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 669; Louisiana Nat.
Bank v. Henderson, (1906) 116 La. 413, 40 S. 779; Provident Bank & Trust
Co. v. Saxon, (1906) 116 La. 408, 40 So. 778; Eaton v. Walker (1889) 76
Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638, 6 L. R. A. 102; Smith v. Warden, (1885) 86 Mo.
382; Abbott v. Omaha Smelting Co., (1876) 4 Neb. 416; Hill v. Beach,
(1858) 12 N. J. Eq. 31;.Bain v. Clinton, Loan Assoc., (1893) 112 N. C. 248,
17 S. E. 154; New York Nat. Exch. Bank v. Crowell, (1896) 177 Pa. 313,
35 Atl. 613; Guckert v. Hacke, (1893) 159 Pa. 303, 28 Atl. 249; Meyer v.
Brunson, (1915) 104 S. C. 84, 88 S. E. 359; De Soto Bank v. Reed, (1908)
50 Tex. Civ. A. 102, 109 S. W. 256; Bergeron v. Hobbs, 96 Wis. 641, (1897)
71 N. W. 1056, 65 A. S. R. 85; Jennings v. Dark, (1910) 175 Ind. 332, 92
N. E. 778; Kennedy v. Fulton Merc. Co., (1908) 33 Ky. L. Rep. 60, 108
S. W. 948; Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Bate, (1894) 96 Ky. 356, 26 S. W.
538, 49 A. S. R. 300; Williams v. Hewitt, (1895) 47 La. Ann. 1076, 17 S.
496, 49 A. S. R. 394; Martin v. Fewell, (1883) 79 Mo. 401.
1Cincinnati Volksblatt Co. v. Hoffmeister, (1900) 62 Oh. St. 189, 200,
56 N. E. 1033, 48 L. R. A. 732; Upton v. Englehart, (1874) 3 Dill.
(U.S.C.C) 496, 497, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 800; Whitman v. Oxford National
Bank, (1899) 176 U. S. 559, 563, 44 L. Ed. 587, 20 S. C. R. 477.69 Col. L. Rev. 288-89.
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"If for example we say that XYZ, a corporation, has entered
into a certain contract with A, we mean that as to form and
procedure the transaction has been carried out as if the XYZ
association of individuals were a single person having XYZ as
his name. Similarly, it is no doubt true, according to a number
of decisions that a perfect legal title to land cannot be transferred
merely by all the stockholders joining in a conveyance. This
obviously does not indicate that the stockholders as such are
not the exclusive holders of the legal rights, powers, liberties, etc..
relating to that land; it shows merely that the form and method
of transferring title to this particular land is different from that
which would be sufficient if, e.g. the owners were ordinary joint
tenants or tenants in common. The transfer must, in accordance
with the forms prescribed by law, be made as if the corporation
were itself a single person owning the land and acting through
certain representatives."
If in a fundamental way and avoiding this descriptive formula
of the corporate personality, we look at the question of the stock-
holders' liability on the contract made in the name of the corporate
entity, we must say the stockholders' liability is contractual. There
are many cases in which this liability has been described as con-
tractual.7 Perhaps the strongest statement of this view is made
by Justice Brewer in the well known case of Whitman v. Oxford
Mational Bank8 where he said:
"The liability which by the constitution and statutes is thus
declared to rest upon the stockholders, though statutory in origin,
is contractual in its nature. It would not be doubted that if the
stockholders in this corporation had formed a partnership the
obligations of each partner to the others and to creditors would
be contractual, and determined by the general common law in
respect to partnerships. If Kansas had provided for partnerships
with limited liability, and then parties complying with the provi-
sions of the statute, had formed such a partnership, it would also
be true that their obligations to one another and to creditors
would be contractual, although only in the statute was to be
found the authority for creation of such obligations, and it is
none the less so when these same stockholders organized a cor-
poration under a law of Kansas, which prescribed the nature of
the obligations which each thereby assumed to the others and to
7Kennedy v. California Savings Bank, (1892) 97 Cal. 93, 96, 31 Pac.
846; Aldrich v. Anchor Coal, etc., Co., (1893) 24 Ore. 32, 37, 32 Pac.
756; Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, (1899) 176 U. S. 559, 563, 44
L. Ed. 587, 20 S. C. R. 477; Bernheiser v. Converse, (1906) 206 U. S. 516,
529, 51 L. Ed. 1163, 27 S. C. R. 755; Bell v. Farwell, (1898) 176 Ill. 489,
497, 52 N. E. 346, 42 L. R. A. 804, 68 A. S. R. 194; Western National Bank
v. Lawrence, (1898) 117 Mich. 669, 672, 76 N. W. 105; Hawarth v. Angle,(1900) 162 N. Y. 179, 187, 56 N. E. 489, 47 L. R. A. 725; Kulp v. Fleming,
(1901) 65 Oh. St. 321, 338, 62 N. E. 334; Cushing v. Perot, (1896) 175 Pa.
St. 66, 34 Atl. 447, 34 L. R. A. 737.
8(1899) 176 U. S. 559, 563, 44 L. Ed. 587, 20 S. C. R. 477.
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the creditors. While this statute of Kansas permitted the form-
ing of the corporation under certain conditions, the actions of
these parties was purely voluntary. In other words they entered
into a contract authorized by the statute."
There has been some dissent from this view that the nature of
the liability is contractual and the contention made that the obliga-
tion is quasi-contractual rather than contractualY
Professor Hohfeld champions this view. He says :'o
"Over and over again, therefore, the obligation of X and
the other stockholders may come into existence without this actual
concurrence, and, in some cases, in spite of their express dissent
and minority vote. Further, even if X expressly yields his assent
to a contemplated corporate obligation and votes with the ma-
jority, the obligation thereafter fixed upon him and his fellows
results not from his voluntary act alone or from exercise of his
individual power alone; on the contrary, it results from the voli-
tions and the concurrent exercise of rights and powers of a
majority of the stockholders and the corporate officers and agents
whose will may be involved. The obligation and liability of X,
in other words, grows out of the relation which he has, by joining
the corporation voluntarily constituted between himself and his
fellow-stockholders. In view of the foregoing considerations, the
obligation and liability in question may, perhaps be accurately
described as quasi-contractual rather than contractual."
But does this not go too far in assuming that actual meeting
of minds is a prerequisite to contract? Professor Williston has
pointed out that the test of assent is objective rather than sub-
jective, whether there is an expression that would normally
indicate assent, not whether the minds of the parties met."' And
Professor Costigan has shown that the objective test should be
applied in the field of implied-in-fact contracts as well as in the
express contracts.' 2 The objective test Of assent should be satis-
fied as well by conduct as by words. The instances are numerous
where a contract arises without actual mental assent. There are
the notorious instances of the transmission of words through an
intermediary who makes a mistake in the words transmitted, and
the mailing of acceptance before receipt of revocation, where a
contract arises without actual mutual assent. Common instances
are to be found in cases where custom forms a part of the con-
tract. It is not essential in such cases that the parties knew of
9Hancock National Bank v. Farnun, (1898) 20 R. I. 466, 470, 40 At.
341; Crippen v. Laighton, (1899) 69 N. H. 540, 44 Atl. 538, 46 L. R. A. 467,
76 A. S. R. 192; Post & Co. v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., (1886) 144 Mass. 341,
343, 11 N. E. 540.
109 Col. L. Rev. 312-13.
1114 Ill. L. Rev. 85-95.1233 Harv. L. Rev. 376-400.
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rules established by custom. Most indorsers undertake contract
obligations they never had in mind.
In the field of obligations where one is bound by the acts or
expressions of another, there are many instances when the law
imposes contractual liability without actual mental assent. It is
difficult to spell out actual mental assent on the part of the prin-
cipal to all contracts made by his agent, when the agent has been
given a large measure of discretion, and it is dearly impossible
to do so where the agent makes a contract within the general
scope of the business but in violation of an express limitation
on his authority by the principal. Yet no case has been found
which questions that the liability of the principal is contractual
in such cases. In the case of unincorporated associations not part-
nerships, and in partnerships, the basis of liability of members who
did not contract directly rests upon the principles of the law
of agency, and frequently members are held liable who do not
actually mentally assent to the contract. Thus members of a
college class who attend a class meeting and who assent to a vote
being taken for a class publication are bound in contract, though
they voted against the proposal."3
The members of a voluntary unincorporated association, such
as a class, committee, club or society, are not by virtue of member-
ship in such association liable on contracts made in behalf of such
association, where such associations were not formed for the
purpose of making such contracts. There is lacking in such cases
the necessary objective assent. But where it is part of the scheme
or purpose of the organization to undertake certain contracts,
contracts made on the credit of the association may be entered into
by a majority vote, or at the discretion of a committee or an
officer whose duty is to enter into such transactions for the associ-
ation, even against the express dissent of members, who are no
less bound by the contract than the assenting members. By be-
coming a member of the association a person assents in advance
to be bound by its proper contracts. It seems wiser to say the
assent in such cases is sufficient for contract, and to treat these
as contractual obligations of the parties as the courts have done,
than to throw them over into the class of quasi-contract obligations.
So long as principals, members of unincorporated associations,
and partnerships are bound by contracts in spite of their specific
non-assent to the contract, there seems to be no ground, at least
'
3Wilcox v. Arnold, (1895) 162 Mass. 577, 39 N. E. 414.
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so far as the element of assent is concerned, for distinguishing the
liability of stockholders on the contract of the corporation and
treating them as quasi-contractual. 14
Does defectiveness of incorporation change the nature of the
stockholders' liability on corporate contracts? Where the stock-
holder has nothing to do with the insufficiency of incorporation,
is in no way responsible for it and has no knowledge of it, we can-
not say the consensual elements of the contract are changed. The
objection to treating the stockholders' contract as a corporate
one, no matter how defective the incorporation, it is submitted, is
not to be found in principles peculiar to the. law of contracts. The
objections, if any, rest in public policy. Apart from public policy,
stockholders in a corporation, no matter how defectively organized,
should be able to sue or be held liable on contracts as if they were
a corporation.
What are the considerations of public policy which are opposed
to giving validity to the corporate contract? Is it that the associ-
ates in a defective corporation should not be allowed to sue or
be sued or to do 5usiness in the corporate name? This is hardly
more than a technical objection. It has been ably shown that
associates who have never even attempted to incorporate should
not be denied the privilege of suing or being sued, or doing busi-
ness, in the corporate name. 5
The only substantial objection to treating an insufficiently
incorporated association as a corporation is the possibility of fraud
and imposition upon persons who have dealt with it, for such per-
sons would have lost their recourse against the individual members
without being assured of that substituted security which legal
incorporation would have- given them.1" Subject to safeguard
against abuse of immunity from individual liability, persons should
be as free to associate themselves into corporations by contract as
to form partnerships or other voluntary associations.17
'
4But even if the obligation is treated as quasi-contractual because
-arising from the relation, still the nature of the obligation should be de-
termined by the nature of the relation the parties intended to establish.
The, non-partnership, non-corporation association would be a relationship
giving rise to a different type of obligation from that of the partnership
and the partnership a different obligation from that of the corporation.
15See able article on Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions
by Professor Wesley A. Sturges, in 33 Yale L. Jour. 383.
162 Morawetz, Private Corporations secs. 652, 744.
17"In a free commercial country, individuals should have the power
by mere private contract or agreement to associate themselves together as
a corporation for any merely private lawful object. They should enjoy
the same freedom in the formation of corporations that Anglo-Saxon
jurisprudence has always accorded in the formation of partnerships ot
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Since the basis of the doctrine of de facto corporations is that
compliance with the de facto requisites furnishes the necessary
safeguard against abuse of the immunity from individual liability,
it would be well if the de facto requisites were re-defined to
accord with this fundamental reason which is the excuse for its
existence. The de facto requisites should be so stated that the
parties to a corporate contract would be confined to relief upon
the contract, except -where the person dealing with the corporation
would, if his remedy were limited to the contract, suffer loss by
reason of the inadequacy of incorporation. This would greatly
simplify matters and give the person contracting with the cor-
poration relief and all the relief he is entitled to in that situation.
But where relief on the corporate contract is inadequate or is
denied because of defectiveness of incorporation, what remedy,
if any, should the person who contracted with the associates as a
corporation have?
We have seen that about half the American decisions' refuse
to hold the members to unlimited liability on the contract as
partners upon the simple and obviously sufficient ground that the
associates did not agree to be bound as partners and the party
contracting -with them did not intend to contract with them as such,
and that to do so involved not only a nullification of the contract
the parties entered into, but the imposition upon the parties, of a
contract they positively intended not to make.19 These courts
confine the relief of the person contracting with the corporation,
to those persons who actively participated in making the contract,
on the theory that an agent who contracts for a non-existent or
incompetent principal is liable.
2 0
That an agent may be liable on the ground of an implied
warranty of authority seems never to have been questioned since
the decision of Collen v. Wright2' in 1857, and this has been ex-
voluntary associations. To be sure, safeguards against fraud should be
provided, and particularly against abuse of that immunity from individual
liability of the members for the debts of the company which in popular
estimation constitutes the most valuable, if not the most essential, char-
acteristic of a commercial corporation. But subject to all needful restric-
tions of this sort, the organization of corporations in any country that
prides itself on freedom of contract and, of the right of its citizens to
co-operate in the most effective manner in any lawful enterprise, should
be as free as the formation of unincorporated associations."
1 Machen, Modern Law of Corporations, sec. 1.
'
5 See note 3 supra.
192 Morawetz, Private Corporations, sec. 748.
20Johnson v. Corser, (1885) 34 Minn. 355, 25 N. W. 799; Fay v. Noble,
(1851) 7 Cush. (Mass.) 188, 194.
21(1857) 8 El. & BI. 647, 27 L. J. Q. B. 215, 4 Jur. N. S. 357, 6 W. R.
123.
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tended to a warranty of the existence of a principal 22 and to the
competency of that principal.23 The basis of this liability on an
implied warranty is that the agent impliedly represents when he
purports to enter into a contract for his principal, that he has
a principal who authorized the agent to make the contract, 24
although it is true the agent is held liable in assumpsit on the
implied warranty,2 5 and many cases even hold the agent on the
contract he purported to make for the principal .2
It therefore seems a proper application of these principles
of agency to hold liable upon a theory of implied warranty those
persons who actively participate in making the corporate contract,
where there was no corporation competent to contract.
Are the divers reasons given to support the view that defective
corporations are partnerships sound? It is argued that the law
knows but two forms of association for business or trade, corpor-
ations and partnerships, and as the members intended corporate
liability, a liability of some sort, and the law refuses to impose
the corporate liability intended, they must be liable as partners ;27
that the application of the same principles by which a dormant
partner is held liable will result in imposing unlimited individual
liability upon the members of defectively incorporated associa-
tions;28 that the fact that they did not intend a partnership is
no objection to holding members of such an association liable as
partners, for persons may be held liable as partners who never
intended to become partners ;29 that it is no answer to holding such
persons to unlimited individual liability that they intended no
22Yonge v. Toynbee, (1910) 1 K. B. 215, 79 L. J. K. B. 208, 102 L. T.
57; Lagrone v. Timmerman, (1895) 46 S. C. 372, 24 S. E. 290.23Edings v. Brown, (1845) 1 Rich. (S.C.) 255; Farmers Trust Co. v.
Floyd, (1890) 47 Oh. St. 525, 26 N. E. 110, 21 A. S. R. 846, 12 L. R. A. 346.24Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., secs. 1374, 1379, 1391.
25Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., sec. 1398.26Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., sec. 1396.27Machen, Modem Law of Corporations, sec. 293, states this reason
thus: "Although it is true that the members of the association did not
intend to become partners, they did intend to engage in a joint enterprise
as an associated body. Now, the law knows but two forms of associations
for business or trade--corporations and partnerships; and as they are not
a corporation they must be a partnership."
Mechem, Elements of Partnership sec. 10, states this reason as fol-
lows: "It is contended that the ijarties must have intended that they become
liable in some way, and inasmuch as they have failed to bind themselves
as a corporation, it must be assumed that they are liable as partners-that
it is only through the fact that they are corporators and not partners that
they escape personal liability; and hence if the corporate shield fails, the
individual liability necessarily arises."28Burdick, Are Defectively Incorporated Associations Partnerships?
6 Col. L. Rev. 1, 6.
29Burdick, op. cit. p. 9.
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such liability, for such liability is frequently imposed though
none was intended ;30 and that it is by virtue of legal incorporation
that members of a corporation escape individual liability and not
by virtue of contract, for members of an unincorporated associa-
tion can escape individual liability only by a clear and express
provision in the contract with the creditor, to that effect."'
Let us examine these reasons seriatim.
Is the oft repeated arguiment for partnership liability, that
as the law refuses to hold the members of the association to be
members of a corporation they must be partners, since there are
no other than the two forms of association for business known to
the law sufficient? If for purposes of argument we admit that
there are only two forms of association for business does it follow
as a necessary inference that if the parties intended corporate
liability when they entered into the contract, and that is impossible
under the law, the members of the association are liable as
partners? Is not the inference of no liability a possible one? In
fact the usual result of a failure on the part of the law to impose
the liability the parties contemplated by their contract, is not to
impose a new or different contract, but to impose no contract
liability at all. This argument would have the result of creating
a corporation whenever a futile attempt to form a partnership
was made. This is obviously absurd. There is no good reason
why the law should refuse to recognize the existence of unincor-
porated associations which are not partnerships. In fact do we not
have many associations for business or trade which are neither
partnerships nor corporations? Have we not cases of tenants in
common, lessor and lessee, trustee and cestui, lender and borrower,
subpartnerships, unincorporated associations, and in those juris-
dictions which refuse to hold defectively incorporated associations
to be partnerships, a further group of associations which are
neither corporations nor partnerships? This argument for part-
nership liability is artificial and obviously insufficient.
Is the liability of a dormant partner an analogy for holding the
members of a defectively organized corporation to unlimited
liability? Professor Burdick in an able article on Are Defectively
Incorporated Associations Partners ? contends that it is. He
argues by way of illustration, "a business is conducted in the name
3OWarren, Collateral Attack on Incorporation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 305,
312.
3'Burdick, Are Defectively Incorporated Associations Partnerships?
6 Col. L. Rev. 7-8.
326 Col. L. Rev. 1, 6.
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of John Smith. X becomes a creditor for goods sold. He takes
a promissory note for the debt signed 'John Smith.' When selling
the goods and taking the note, he supposes that John Smith is the
sole owner of the business and gives credit in accordance with
that supposition. Afterwards, he discovers that John Jones was
all this time a dormant partner of John Smith. X is entitled to
sue Smith alone, or to sue Smith and Jones." And he further
continues "that the creditor of a business association, who sues the
stockholders as partners upon discovering they were not a cor-
poration acts precisely as the law permits the creditor of a dor-
mant partner to act." Let us admit the creditor is acting similarly
in each situation and if he is allowed to recover there is the
further analogy that in each instance the creditor gets something
he did not expect to get. But when we shift from the creditor
end, the right end, to the obligation end of the contract, does the
analogy hold out? Are the positions of the stockholders and the
dormant partners analogous? Is the element of consent and
authorization the same in each case? The dormant partner, by
becoming a partner, authorizes the imposition of unlimited in-
dividual liability as to transactions within the scope of the part-
nership business; the stockholder, on the other hand, by becoming
a stockholder authorizes the imposition of only corporate liability.
The dormant partner is not liable on a contract made by John
Smith unless he authorized it. How jealoiusly'the courts insist on
*this authorization as the basis of the dormant partner's liability
may be seen from the fact that if he did not authorize the contract
he cannot even make himself liable by ratification. 3  The truth
is the -two situations are not analogous, the dormant partner
authorizes unlimited individual liability, while the stockholder
authorizes only corporate liability, and the application to the con-
tract of the member of the defectively organized corporation,
of the principle by which the dormant partner is held liable,
namely authorization, will held him to corporate liability only,
that is excuse him from unlimited individual liability.
Should the members of a defectively incorporated association
escape liability as partners by reason of the fact that they did not
intend to form a partnership? Professor Burdick"4 argues that
33That the undisclosed principal (the dormant partner is an undis-
closed principal) cannot make himself liable by ratification, see Keighley
v. Durant, [1901] A. C. 240; 1 Mechem, Agency 2nd Ed., sec. 386. Per-
haps the only state which allows the undisclosed principal to make him-
self a party to the contract by ratification is Massachusetts, see Hayward
v. Langmaid, (1902) 181 Mass. 426, 63 N. E. 912.-
34Burdick, 6 Col. L. Rev. 9.
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they should not. Is his argument sound? He supports his con-
tention by the following quotations from the opinion of judge
Cooley in Beecher v. Bush."5
"It is possible for parties to intend no partnership and yet
to form one. If they agree upon an arrangement which is a part-
nership in fact, it is of no importance that they call it something
else, or that they even expressly declare that they are not part-
ners. The law must declare what is the legal import of their
agreements, and names go for nothing where the substance of
the arrangement shows them to be inapplicable." 36
But further quotations from this same opinion of Judge
Cooley's will make it obvious that it cannot be cited as authority
for holding members of a. defective corporation liable as partners.
He says:
"Every doubtful case must be solved in favor of their intent;
otherwise we should carry the doctrine of constructive partner-
ship so far as to render it a trap to the unwary.37  . . . Ex-
cept when one allows the public or individual dealers to be de-
ceived by the appearances of partnership when none exists, he
is never to be charged as a partner unless by contract and intent
he has formed a relationship in which the elements of partner-
ship are to be found. And what are these? At the very least the
following: Community of interest in some lawful commerce or
business for the conduct of which the parties are mutually prin-
cipals of and agents for each other, with general powers within
the scope of the business. 38  . . . The test of partnership
must be found in the intent of the parties themselves.
Our conclusion is that Beecher and Williams having never in-
tended to constitute a partnership are not as between themselves
partners. There was no common property, no agency of either
to act "for the other or both, no participation in profits, no sharing
of losses." 9
We must admit that if the parties "agree upon an arrangement
which is a partnership in fact"-a relationship which has the
essential characteristics of a partnership, it is unimportant that the
parties intended not to be subjected to partnership liability,-a
liability the law inevitably imposes by virtue of assent to that rela-
tionship. But such admission is not a sanction for the imposition
of partnership liability upon persons who subscribe for or pur-
chase stock in a corporation. The person who takes stock in a
35(1881) 45 Mich. 188, 7 N. W. 785, 40 Am. Rep. 465.36Beecher v. Bush, (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 193-194, 7 N. W. 785, 40 Am.
Rep. 465.37Beecher v. Bush, (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 194, 7 N. W. 785, 40 Am.
Rep. 465.3SBeecher v. Bush, (1881) 45 Mich. 188, 200, 7 N. W: 785, 40 Am.
Rep. 465.39Beecher v. Bush, (18.81) 45 Mich. 188, 204, 7 N. W. 785, 40 Am,
Rep. 465.
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corporation intends to enter into a relationship or association with
characteristics differing in almost every conceivable respect from
those of a partnership.
One of the outstanding differences between partnerships and
corporations is in the power of the members to subject the associ-
ation to liability. When the parties enter into a partnership re-
lation they contemplate the transaction of a business which
they are to own in common and carry on as principals and agents
for each other and for their mutual pecuniary gain. If they
contemplate such an association, it matters not that they did not
call it a partnership nor that they did not intend to assume partner-
ship liability, for that is a mere conseqhence of the relation they
have established, of the power they have vested in the other
members. Because of this power of general agency in the partners
it follows that an express limitation on the power of a partner
not known to the one dealing with him is ineffectual where the
transaction is one in the scope of the partnership business. On the
other hand, when a person takes stock in a corporation he does
not contemplate entrance into the business as a mutual principal
and agent, and because of this absence of general agency, the
other stockholders have no power by virtue of membership, to
bind him even within the scope of the corporation's business, and
limitations of power are unnecessary.
But the corporation differs from the partnership not only in
respect to the powers of its members, but in respect to the interests,
rights and duties of the members inter sese and with those who
deal with them, and also in respect to the transferability of those
powers, interests, rights and duties. In fact the differences are
so marked that it seems inexcusable to ignore them and say intent
to enter into one may make a person a member of the other.
Should the members of a defectively incorporated association
escape unlimited liability by reason of the fact that they intended
only a limited or corporate liability? Professor Warren argues
that they should not. He says "The contention that out of a
consensual transaction no obligation can arise except such as the
parties intended to arise is not sound. The law frequently imposes
upon the parties to a consensual transaction certain obligations not
covered by their actual or expressed intent. Thus A, owner of a
tract of land, may convey a portion of it to B, and A may find
that the law imposes an easement for B over the land retained,
although he had no intent that B should have such easement.
Thus A may sell goods to B and find that the law imposes upon
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him a warranty of their quality, although he had no intent to
make such a warranty. Then A may, without authority, assume
as agent of B, to contract with C, and may find the law imposes
upon him personally a liability urrder the contract.
"The agent does not intend to be bound himself at all, but if
he acts without authority, full liability for the act rests upon
him. The associates intend to be bound, but with limited liability.
If they are without authority to limit their liability, full liability
for the act rests upon them."40
Are these cases of easement by necessity and implied warranties
analogies for holding the stockholders to a liability they intended
not to assume? In the first place it is not clear that the examples
given are cases in which the obligation which the law imposes was
not intended. "The grant or reservation of a way of necessity is
implied merely to accord with the presumed intent of the parties,"4 1
and it has been ably argued that warranties, such as those cited,
have sufficient consensual element to make them contractual rather
than quasi-contractual in nature,42 and it would seem clear in the
easement and warranty cases that no obligation would be imposed
if the parties expressed an intent against such implication. It is the
law that the implication of a way of necessity may be excluded by
particular language in the conveyance, 43 and that no warranties of
quality by a seller, nor of implied authority by an agent will arise
if the seller or agent by words or by conduct indicates a warranty
is not intended.
44
Now contracting on a corporate basis is manifesting an intent
not to contract on a basis of individual liability, and should there-
fore prevent the implication of an obligation intended not to be
assumed from arising. The easement and warranty cases instead
of being an analogy for unlimited liability, on the contract, are
an analogy for not imposing such liability. To impose partnership
liability, or any sort of individual liability, in contract on the
stockholders, is substituting in place of the intended contractual
obligation, (the corporate obligation), a contractual obligation
which neither of the parties intended should be assumed.
It is admitted to be well established law that partners may by
a provision in their contract limit their personal liability to their
40Collateral Attack on Incorporation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 312.
412 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd Ed.; 1302.
42Costigan, Implied-in-fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 376, 400.43Seeley v. Bishop, (1848) 19 Conn. 128.
44Williston, Sales, sec. 234; 1 Mechem, Agency, 2nd Ed., sec. 1369;
Lilly, Wilson & Co. v. Smales, (1892) 1 Q. B. 456, 40 W. R. 544.
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interest in a specific fund or the funds or property of the partner-
ship.4 -5 It would seem that this limitation may be accomplished
by a stipulation in the partnership's agreement or other agreement
between the partners known to the one dealing with the partner-
ship.46  But as limited personal liability can be secured by the
partners only by a clear stipulation to that effect, 47 it is argued that
as the corporate contract contains no such stipulation, stockholders
in a defective corporation should be held to unlimited individual
liability.4 8 But does not this argument ignore the fundamental
distinction between partnership and corporate methods of doing
business, in particular, the distinction which exists between the
usual and normal liabilities of partners and of stockholders?
Since universally partners are liable personally unless it is expressly
provided to the contrary, partners have no ground to complain
if they are held personally liable in the absence of restrictive
stipulations. Since stockholders are universally held free from
unlimited personal liability in the absence of express provisions 49
for liability in the statutes or articles of incorporation, and since
45Halket v. Merchants Traders Ins. Co., (1849) 13 Q. B. 960, 19
L. J. Q. B. 59, 14 Jur. 222; Hassell v. Merchants Traders Ins. Co., (1849)
4 Ex. 525, 19 L. J. Ex. 183; In re Athenaeum Life Ins. Co., (1858) 4 Kay
& John. 517, 527; Hallett v. Dowdall, (1852) 18 Q. B. 2; Hess v. Werts,
(1818) 4 Serg. & R. 356, 361.46That restrictions on the powers of partners known to persons deal-
ing with the partner are effectual is so well recognized that it needs no
citation of authority to the learned readers of this Review. The Uniform
Partnership Act, sec. 9, par. (4), provides: "No act in contravention
of a restriction on authority shall bind the partnership to persons having
knowledge of the restriction." See also Story, Partnership, sec. 164, as
to limiting liability to a specific fund in partnership articles.47Thus in Hess v. Werts, (1818) 4 Serg. & R. 356, 361, a partnership
issued notes "payable to bearer on demand out of the joint funds, accord-
ing to the articles of association," and the articles provided the payment
was to be made when convenient. The partners were held to personal
liability on these notes. The court said, "they may limit their responsi-
bility, by an explicit stipulation made with the party with whom they
contract, and clearly understood by him at the time." But the court thought
this stipulation equivocal and one facilitating the commission of fraud.
4SBurdick, 6 Col. L. Rev. 6.
49"By the common law there was no individual liability of the mem-
bers of a corporation for corporate debts beyond the enforcement of their
agreed contribution to the capital stock." Wechselberg v. Flour City Na-
tional Bank, (1894) 12 C. C. A. 56, 26 L. R. A. 470, 64 Fed. 90; citing Terry
v. Little, (1879) 101 U. S. 216, 25 L. Ed. 864; United States v. Knox,
(1880) 102 U. S. 422, 26 L. Ed. 216.
"No doubt it has been settled for a long time that individual members
are not liable for the debts of a corporation, and it has even been said
that 'the personal responsibility of the stockholders is inconsistent with
the nature of a body corporate;' yet in the Roman law it seems that if the
corporation became insolvent the persons constituting it were obliged to
contribute their private fortunes; and though it may be hazardous to
assert that at common law the rule was the same in England, it is certain
that, so far as the evidence goes, it points to that conclusion." 2 Harv.
L. Rev. 160.
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incorporation statutes usually provide for limited liability, the
stockholder who knows nothing of the defect in incorporation
does have a good basis for complaint if he is held liable by reason
of the absence of a provision for limited liability in his contract
with the third person.
Thus we have found no sufficient reason for violating the
contract of the stockholder of the defectively organized corpora-
tion, and we may go further and say that an examination of the
cases will show there is no real support for so doing in the great
majority of the cases which purport to stand for partnership
liability. The facts of these cases do not show that the doctrine
of partnership liability is needed to explain the result reached nor
that the principle of the liability of an agent for impliedly war-
ranting the competency of his principal to contract, will not ex-
plain the decisions. In few, if any, of the cases, do the facts
show that the defendants held liable were not actively participat-
ing in making the corporate contract. In most of them it is not
an unfair inference that they were actively participating. It must
be borne in mind that these cases were dealt with on the theory
of partnership liability, and under that theory membership in the
association is all that is required for liability, and therefore the
facts relating to active participation by the defendants are more
or less submerged or only mentioned incidentally. In most of
these cases the facts show the defendants were incorporators who
were few in numbers, 50 and therefore presumptively active or
5OThus in Wechselberg v. Flour City Nat. Bank, (1894) 12 C. C. A. 56,
64 Fed. 90, 26 L. R. A. 470, only the three original incorporators were held
liable and one of them sought to escape liability on the ground that he
did not participate in the business which was undertaken, but the court
found that he had participated sufficiently to make himself a party to the
assumption of corporate powers.
In Garnett v. Richardson, (1879) 35 Ark. 144, only the three original
incorporators of the company were held liable and it is probable that
each was actihe.
In Bigelow v. Gregory, (1874) 73 Ill. 197 and Pettis v. Atkins, (1871)
60 Ill. 454, only the signers of the original articles were sued.
In Central Nat. Bank v. Sheldon, (1912) 86 Kans. 460, 121 Pac. 340,
it was only the two incorporators who were sued and in McLennan v.
Hopkins, (1895) 2 Kans. App. 260, 41 Pac. 1061 while the number does
not appear, it was only the organizers who were held.
In Kennedy v. Fulton Merc. Co., (1908) 33 Ky. L. Rep. 60, 108 S. W.
948, only the persons who subscribed for stock and elected officers and
authorized the lease of P's store were held liable.
In Abbot v. Omaha Smelting Co., (1876) 4 Neb. 416 defendant was
an incorporator and president but had no stock.
In Perrine v. Levin, (1910) 68 Misc. 327, 123 N. Y. S. 1007, original
incorporators were the only defendants.
In Guckert v. Hacker, (1893) 159 Pa. St. 303, 28 AtI. 249 only sub-
scribers were held liable.
In Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co., (1891) 4 Willson (Tex.) 221, 15
S. W. 200 only incorporators were held.
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show positively active participation.-' Liability of the defend-
ants in assumpsit on the corporate contract, while unwarranted on
sound principle, is not out of accord with a liability imposed on
the basis of implied warranty. Frequently the agent is held on
his principal's contract where the basis is breach of implied war-
ranty of authority.
The result reached in some of these cases which hold the de-
fendant on the ground that he is liable as a partner, are not
unjust if the facts are such that he would have been liable on
an implied warranty of the competency of his principal, but if
the facts are such that he would not be held liable as an agent,
they may have been such that the result reached was grossly un-
just. For example in Kaiser v. Lawrence Savings Bank5 2 if the
defendant, who was not an original incorporator was neverthe-
less active in the management of the Kansas corporation, it is no
greater hardship for him to be held liable to the creditor of the
corporation than is the hardship that is commonly imposed upon
agents, but if the defendant was a resident of Iowa and pur-
chased one or a few shares of stock in this Kansas corporation, in
which there is a large outstanding stock, and plaintiff finds it
convenient to sue defendant because he resides in Iowa and has
51In Harrill v. Davis, (1909) 94 C. C. A. 47, 168 Fed. 187, each of the
defendants either expressly authorized or actively participated in incurring
the indebtedness for which they were held liable.
In Forbes v. Whittemore, (1896) 62 Ark. 229, 35 S. W. 223 each of the
defendants authorized or participated in incurring the indebtedness for
which they were held liable.
In Cincinnati Cooperage Co. v. Bate, (1894) 96 Ky. 356, 26 S. W. 538,
49 A. S. R. 300 three defendants purchased all the stock of a corporation,
changed its name (not in manner required by state)' and continued its
business. Held individually liable on draft given in corporate name.
In Eaton v. Walker, (1889) 76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638, 6 L. R. A. 102
three defendants incorporated under a law which was void because of
defective title. Plaintiff was allowed to hold them individually as part-
ners, although one of them had received no benefit from the business and
taken no part in its affairs, other than attending meetings, he being a
director and vice-president.
In Journal Co. v. Nelson, (1908) 133 Mo. App. 482, 113 S. W. 690 the
four defendants organized a fraudulent mining company and were held
liable as partners for the cost of publishing their prospectus, signed by
one of their members. No authorization was mentioned but it seems a
necessary inference.
In Sexton v. Snyder, (1906) 119 Mo. App. 668, 94 S. W. 562, all steps
had been taken to form a corporation but the secretary of state refused a
certificate. Defendants who were directors and among the original in-
corporators held individually liable.
In De Soto Bank v. Reed, (1908) 50 Tex. Civ. App. 102, 109 S. W.
256 -the members were held individually liable on a draft drawn by an
agent. From the agreed statement of facts "all the defendants actively
participated in the business of the Beaumont-Port Arthur Co., prior and
subsequent to the filing of said charter."
52(1881) 56 Ia. 144, 8 N. W. 772.
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property sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff's demand, it is harsh
and unjust and the corporate method of doing business has oper-
ated as a trap to the unwary purchaser of stock.
There are usually two groups of stockholders, the one, man-
aging and controlling the corporate business, and the other merely
investors in corporate stock with little or no actual voice in the
control of the corporation. There is no necessity for treating
these two groups alike, and to do so frequently works injustice.
The courts have been exceedingly solicitous to protect creditors
who, as experience has shown, are usually alert to guard them-
selves from imposition. Should there not be a disposition to give
more adequate protection to the unwary investor in stocks who,
more frequently than the creditor, is the victim of imposition
and fraud, and who stands in need of greater protection ? 3
To hold persons who take stock in a corporation unlimitedly
liable individually upon the contracts of the corporation because
it is defectively organized, is not only unsound on legal theory
but is bad economic policy. One of the most promising of recent
developments in economic history is the greatly extending dis-
tribution of shares in corporations which means greater invest-
ment in such securities by smaller capitalists and employees. 54
The successful pursuit of the corporate method of doing busi-
ness is absolutely essential to our economic prosperity and de-
velopment. To make the innocent purchaser of stock in a cor-
poration liable to the full extent of his fortune, because it may
turn out that the incorporating statute was unconstitutional or
organized in one state to do business in another,56 or is organized
under a statute authorizing a different sort of corporation than
the one in question, or the incorporators did not act in good
faith, or because the corporation may have been found to be de-
fective for a variety of other reasons, is to subject him to a real
53The recent blue sky legislation shows a realization by legislatures
of the need and is in the right direction.54 1n 1913 the Wall Street Journal calculated that 327 large corporations
had 1,251,468 shareholders listed on their books. The average holdings
of stock in corporations is rapidly becoming less and more of it is being
owned by employees. Thus Armour & Company stock is owned by 77,000
persons, 40,000 of whom are employees of the company who have invested
their savings.
55Eaton v. Walker, (1889) 76 Mich. 579, 43 N. W. 638; Williams v.
Bank of Michigan, (1831) 7 Wend. (N.Y.) 539; 1 Cook, Corporations,
7th Ed., sec. 236; 21 Harv. L. Rev. 314.
56Montgomery v. Forbes, (1889) 148 Mass. 249, 19 N. E. 342; Taylor
v. Branham & Co., (1895) 35 Fla. 297, 17 So. 552, 39 L. R. A. 362, 48 A. S. R.
249; Land Grant Ry. v. Coffey Co., (1870) 6 Kan. 245; Empire Mills v.
Alston Groc. Co., (1891) 4 Willson (Tex.) 221, 15 S. W. 200.
426 1INNESOTA LAW REVIEW
hazard which is unjust and unreasonable, and one which would
tend to impair a proper usefulness of the corporate device.
To summarize: Since it is opposed to a correct conception of
the nature of the stockholder's liability, a violation of his con-
tract, the imposition upon him of a contract he never assumed,
and the reasons, one and all, given for so doing are insufficient,
and the decisions in the cases which purport to do so can, at
least in a majority of instances, be reached without so holding
and upon a ground that reconciles them with the cases which
reject this view, and finally, since the doctrine is harsh and
unjust and opposed to sound economic considerations, the mem-
bers of a corporation, no matter how defectively organized, should
not be held liable as partners.
